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The Korean War was the only time during the Cold War that two belligerent coalitions, 
led respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union, were involved in direct, 
armed conflict against each other. Although the historical literature on the Korean War 
has been enriched substantially in recent years, the Communist coalition warfare in Korea 
has not received the attention it deserves.1 Indeed the war-waging capabilities of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) were limited, and its war efforts in Korea depended on 
Soviet equipment, Soviet advice, and particularly Soviet air support. Recent revelations 
of Chinese and former Soviet archival records demonstrate a deep involvement of the 
Soviet Union on the Communist side in the Korean War, especially the Soviet Air Force 
units and other military personnel that were actively participating in the fight against the 
US and its allies.2 Yet, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin's fear of a direct confrontation with 
the United States limited Soviet involvement and assistance in Korea. 
A few days after the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) crossed the Yalu River, the 
Beijing leadership began to draw up a forward-looking air war plan for Korea, which the 
UN commander had almost feared they would do at the time. For almost three years of 
war, despite the assembly of a large force of air power to the north of the Yalu, the 
Communists only could provide limited air defense for their ground operations in Korea. 
This article examines the coalition warfare on the Communist side with a focus on 
analyzing how and why the Chinese and Russians failed to implement the offensive air 
war plan. Perhaps more important, the study of the abortive air war plan demonstrates 
that, although China bore major responsibility for fighting, it had to count on Soviet 
assistance and adhere to Soviet decisions. Like almost any wartime alliance, ideology, 
geopolitics, and national interests are factors that determined how far the Communist 
coalition would go in Korea. In a historical perspective, Soviet limited support in the war 
raised Beijing's suspicions of the reliability of such a relationship with the Soviet Union 
for China's security interests. 
Following China's ground assault in the Korean conflict in late October 1950, the 
Chinese air force, which consisted of only two fighter divisions, one bomber regiment, 
and one attack aircraft regiment, with a total of two hundred combat planes, started 
preparations for air intervention. On 30 October, a meeting was convened focusing on 
when and how the air force should enter the war. Participants concurred that Chinese 
ground forces were at a decided disadvantage in Korea because the United States was in 
effective control of the air. Chinese pilots needed additional training, but arguments were 
made that the history of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had shown that Chinese 
airmen could learn warfare through hands-on training under actual combat conditions. 
Although the Chinese Air Force could not compare with the US Air Force in numbers of 
planes or in technology, Chinese Air Force leaders based their confidence on the Chinese 
Communist Party's leadership, their countrymen's support, and their own ground war 
experience. They were confident that the Chinese Air Force could prevail against US air 
strength, and that the ultimate victory would depend upon ground operations, while the 
air force should play only a supporting role in meeting the needs of ground troops. 
Chinese leaders subsequently devised their strategy which provided that the newly 
established air force should not engage in a war of attrition, which would work to US 
advantage. Their method was to train fliers for the 100 to 150 aircraft that the Chinese 
could mobilize. Those planes should be concentrated for timely attacks on the 
Americans.3
An ambitious, but cautious air war plan for Korea emerged with two implementing 
stages. The Chinese Air Force would first commit four air regiments (120 MiG-15s) to 
provide protection for transportation lines between the Chinese border and Anju in North 
Korea in January and February 1951. Chinese planners hoped that Soviet Air Force units, 
assigned to defend China's airspace since August 1950, would coordinate the operation, 
letting the inexperienced Chinese pilots fly with them in combat. Then, by mid-April, 
there would be six fighter regiments (five MiG-15s and one La-11), two Il-10 attack 
aircraft regiments, and four Tu-2 bomber regiments, totaling 360 planes, available to take 
part in the war. However, both the MiG-15s and Il-10s were short-ranged, and the 
Chinese Air Force needed to construct airfields inside Korea in order to allow their use in 
direct ground support. According to this plan, the strength of the Chinese Air Force 
would be significantly enhanced by the end of 1951 with some 28 flight regiments (25 
MiGs and four La-9 and La-11 regiments), four attack aircraft regiments, seven bomber 
regiments, and four transport regiments, amounting to1,300 war planes.4
Recent Chinese sources reveal that at this time Chinese Air Force leaders actually 
considered two options about how the air force should be used in Korea. One suggested 
that fighters, bombers, and attack aircraft should move into Korea to provide direct 
support for the CPV's ground operations. The other recommended that air force units be 
based only inside China to engage the US aircraft over Korea. The former would give 
ground troops more direct support than the latter, but also would entail a greater risk for 
losing the entire air force. Such a lesson could be drawn easily from the experience of the 
North Korean Air Force, which had been destroyed by the Americans during the first 
month of the war. The CPV leaders and particularly Peng Dehuai, however, demanded 
direct air force support for his ground forces. In early December, the Chinese Air Force 
drew up a plan for air warfare that emphasized direct coordination with the ground 
offensives and concentration of strength for a timely attack. Mao was inclined to a 
prudent approach, but could not evade the pressure from the CPV leaders who pleaded 
for air force support. He approved the direct ground support strategy on 4 December 
1950.5
One of the greatest challenges for the Chinese Air Force's preparation for the Korean 
intervention was to construct airfields. As the CPV recovered most of North Korea's lost 
territory by mid-December 1950, Chinese military leaders began seeking airfields that 
could be built or repaired for commencing the full-scale air offensive against UN forces. 
China's air war plan called for a deployment of 12 air regiments, or about 350 planes, in 
Korea by April 1951. However, implementation of such a plan required building airfields 
in North Korea that would suit jet aircraft. Construction of airfields was set up on a 
priority schedule.6
However, UN air superiority, along with freezing weather, presented a formidable barrier 
to the Chinese air war plan. After several months of effort, in early 1951, the Chinese had 
failed to find any airfield operational inside Korea. Beijing's frustrations were expressed 
in Mao's telegram to Stalin on 1 March. "We plan to send ten air regiments to the war in 
April and May," the Chinese leader complained, "but so far we are unable to find a single 
airfield inside Korean territory operational." In addition to the natural problem that the 
soil was not yet thawing, he stressed the fundamental difficulty was that "the Chinese will 
be unable to construct any airfield in the days to come because they do not have a reliable 
air force to provide cover." Urged by Peng Dehuai, his field commander, Mao appealed 
the Russian leader to take measures to improve the situation.7 Stalin quickly responded to 
China's entreaty. The Russian leader agreed to send Soviet Air Force units to North 
Korea, and to supply the Chinese with two sets of metal strip for use in Korea, as well as 
antiaircraft guns and shells for the protection of airfields. He also requested the Chinese 
prepare four additional airfields with concrete runways for the Soviet MiG units to use.8
Having received such a positive reply from Stalin, Zhou held a talk with Colonel General 
Emen E. Zakharov, the Soviet chief military advisor in Beijing, and then directed Liu 
Yalou, commander of the Chinese air force, and his Russian adviser Major General D. 
Golunov to travel to Shenyang for consultation with their Korean colleagues about how 
airfields would be constructed and how their air forces would operate from them.9 From 
the Chinese Air Force's point of view, it would be better to take a step by step approach. 
Zhou explained to Peng that the Chinese could first build two airfields with pierced steel 
plank runways for one Soviet air division to use; then construct two airfields in the 
Pyongyang area for one Chinese MiG division to be stationed there. After that, Zhou 
continued, two other airfields would be built for another Soviet MiG division and at the 
same time three advanced airfields at Anak, Pyonggang, and Sinmak could be built under 
the protection of Soviet air units. Beijing believed that the burden of manpower, material 
supplies, and transportation would be relatively lessened in this way, but it also 
acknowledged that the air force's entry into the war would be delayed.10
The Russians, not fond of this plan, argued one Soviet MiG division would not be able to 
hold its ground, and thus, insisted China build the four Soviet airfields simultaneously, 
and let North Korea construct the four airfields the Chinese needed.11 Soviet disapproval 
put the Chinese in a predicament. The Chinese Air Force had few engineering units able 
to undertake the task. With little engineering equipment available, progress on the project 
would depend on how much manpower could be mobilized. The Chinese leadership 
originally planned to involve two to three newly recruited divisions of the North Korean 
People's Army (KPA) in the construction of the airfields, and have the Chinese Air Force 
engineering units assist in hopes that the first airfield could be completed by the end of 
March. Although Kim Il Sung had agreed to cooperate, no North Korean soldiers were 
ever sent to do the job by that time.12 Soviet objections, furthermore, compounded the 
problem by insisting on the building of the four airfields at the same time which forced 
Beijing to employ combat troops to do so, a situation Peng was reluctant to accept. 
The CPV had just suffered a serious setback on the battleground in February 1951. Those 
CPV armies that had entered the war since the prior October were weakened severely and 
badly in need of rest and reinforcement. Peng did not want any one of the three crack 
armies (38th, 39th, and 42nd) that just pulled back from the front and were resting in the 
Wonsan-Hamhung area to assume the airfield construction mission. He also disagreed 
with the idea of using one of the newly arrived armies. The agreement between Beijing 
and Pyongyang at this time required the Chinese to construct two airfields with concrete 
runways at Sunan and Sunchon, and two airfields with pierced steel plank runways at 
Yongyu and Namyonni for the Soviets. During the same period, the North Koreans 
would build two airfields in Pyongyang for the Chinese to use.13 Based on the 
contemporary experience at home, Zhou advised Peng that construction of an airfield for 
jet aircraft in China required 24,000 person-days. Considering the difficult conditions in 
North Korea, he believed the construction of the four Soviet airfields would require 
96,000 person-days. But North Korea could not supply that amount of manpower. 
Concluding that this task only could be taken by combat troops, Zhou urged Peng to 
accept the proposed arrangement, noting that if the Soviet Air Force did not move into 
Korea, the Chinese air units never would be able to operate from the advanced airfields 
there.14
In late March, the Central Military Commission (CMC) assigned the 47th Army (three 
divisions and two engineering regiments), and three air force engineering regiments, 
along with more than 1,000 civilian engineers to construction work. Later, additional 
troops (four newly recruited regiments from the 38th Army, plus two divisions and an 
army headquarters from the 50th Army) were mobilized for construction because of slow 
progress.15 Given the Soviet request for an equal number of the Chinese Air Force units 
to move into Korea along with theirs, Zhou implored Moscow on 1 April to furnish China 
with an additional set of steel strip for a third airfield in the Pyongyang area.16 For 
construction of these airfields, China employed some two million person-days, and 
shipped 30,000 tons of cement, 36,000 pieces of steel plate, and other supplies and 
equipment. The Chinese troops worked day and night, and completed the construction at 
Sunan, Yongyu, Namyonni, and Pyongyang by the end of May.17
The airfield rehabilitation program in North Korea had been an alarming concern to UN 
military authorities. During the months of April and May, the Far East Air Force (FEAF) 
Bomber Command conducted airfield attacks routinely to make sure all of these airfields 
were "unserviceable."18 China employed most of the CPV's antiaircraft artillery units 
(eleven regiments), along with the Soviet troops (eight regiments), to protect these 
airfields, while leaving many important targets along the supply lines inadequately 
shielded.19 They failed, however, to prevent UN aircraft from hitting their targets. 
Chinese records show that the UN planes attacked these air facilities 72 times. One third 
of their ordnance (6,826 bombs) hit runways, taxiways, or surrounding facilities. As the 
last airfield at Sunchon was finished in late July, the Chinese realized that the recently 
built airfields could not be used by the Soviet Air Force, because they were too far away 
to receive support from airfields inside China.20 Chinese leaders, therefore, had to 
propose another postponement of the entry of the air force into the war until September.21
Chinese leaders could not forget several months earlier in October 1950 when they tried 
to make a decision on China's intervention into the Korean conflict that Stalin withheld 
his air support promise and left China to mount military operations in Korea without full 
air cover. But despite the concerns of Chinese leaders about US air superiority, Chinese 
ground operations had progressed smoothly. By the end of 1950, the CPV had compelled 
UN forces to retreat and had recovered much of the lost territory in North Korea. As the 
frontline was pushed into South Korea, Chinese hope for a swift decisive victory in 
Korea was shattered. By mid-February 1951, it became obvious to the CPV's 
commanders that the Chinese soldiers could not outmaneuver the motorized enemy 
forces while under constant US air bombardment, with the poor supply facilities, and in 
the bitter cold. In the middle of the fourth phase of the offensive, on 20 February, Peng 
rushed back to Beijing to review China's war strategy with Mao and other Chinese 
leaders.22
During his meeting with Mao, Peng complained that the fighting capability of his troops 
had been weakened severely due to mounting casualties and too little supplies during the 
past few months of offensives. For Peng, the principal cause was that the CPV had no air 
cover or adequate anti-aircraft artillery to protect communication and supply lines, thus 
only "sixty to seventy percent of supplies" could reach the CPV's soldiers at the front. He 
had suggested to Colonel General Zakharov, Soviet chief military advisor in Beijing, that 
the two Soviet air divisions extend their air cover of the CPV's supply lines all the way 
down to the 38th parallel, but received a negative response. Peng now urged Mao 
personally to persuade Moscow to provide air support for his ground operations. On 1 
March 1951, Mao forwarded Peng's appeal to Stalin.23
Two days later, the Soviet leader responded positively, deciding to move two Soviet air 
divisions from Manchuria into Korean territory to provide protection for the rear of China 
and North Korea, but the air defense in the Andong area, he determined, should be 
shouldered by the two Chinese air divisions.24 On 15 March, Stalin further informed Mao 
that it would be better, also, to send two Chinese air divisions to the front for use in the 
upcoming offensive, at which time the Soviet Union would dispatch an additional large 
fighter division (three regiments and 90 MiG-15s) to Andong. Stalin did not indicate his 
reason for this change, other than to argue that the Chinese needed "a large number of 
aviation both at the front and in the rear."25 He evidently still was concerned about the 
military and political danger of deploying Soviet planes in Korea. As mentioned before, 
the Soviets had no confidence that the current strength of their air force in China was 
equal to that of the United Nations. To avoid the danger presented by such imbalance, 
Stalin believed the Chinese had to rely on their own air force at the front. 
Stalin's new decision to strengthen the Soviet air presence at the Yalu River was 
welcomed by Chinese leaders, but they felt far from relieved. On 7 March, the UN forces 
waged a northward attack in central Korea. Hundreds of sorties were mounted by the US 
Air Force to support the advancing ground forces and attack CPV supply lines. With a 
shortage of reinforcement and supplies, the CPV was suffering the first serious battlefield 
reversals since China's full entry into the war. Worried about the persistent UN onslaught 
from the air, on 11 March, Peng complained again to Beijing that without the proper air 
protection of transportation, his troops were continuing to suffer from food shortages, a 
problem that definitely would affect the CPV's ability to conduct its next decisive 
campaign in the Korean War.26
While the CPV leaders and soldiers anxiously yearned for their own air force to join the 
battle, Russian air units had little success in defending the crossings over the Yalu 
River.27 After the UN aircraft repeatedly knocked out the rail bridges between China and 
Korea in late March, Chinese leaders became desperate and turned to the North Koreans 
for help, asking if they could use their propeller fighters to supplement Soviet jets in 
providing cover for the supply lines.28 More critical to the Beijing leadership was the fact 
that there appeared to be no way to secure a full air commitment from the Soviet Air 
Force. The Soviets had agreed to satisfy the Chinese request for more air cover in Korea, 
but it was the Chinese responsibility to meet the Soviet demand for airfields so that the 
Soviet Air Force might be able to operate to the extent that the CPV expected. Without 
effective air cover from the Soviet side, the Chinese found no way to complete the 
constructions on time.29 On the other hand, both Chinese and North Korean leaders did 
not want to risk their own air forces. General Zakharov once criticized Chinese leaders as 
being too cautious to send their air force to Korea. Zhou Enlai disagreed, arguing that 
China would "have no problem to endure losses of fifty thousand or one million army 
soldier, but would not make sacrifice of our newly built air force" in Korea. According to 
the premier, China's Air Force remained small and it would be difficult to develop one if 
the air force was sapped severely in the war.30
While the Chinese felt frustrated at the limited Soviet involvement in the air, the Soviet 
leadership also became uneasy about the situation in Korea. Reportedly, at the start of the 
Korean War, Stalin and other Soviet leaders were convinced that the combination of 
Chinese troops and Soviet weapons was unbeatable.31 But, by the middle of 1951, the 
news from the battlefront indicated that the Soviet-supported Communist troops were 
unable to destroy any significant number of UN forces. According to Peng's report to 
Mao, which was forwarded to Stalin on 4 June 1951, the UN troops possessed not only a 
great quantity of aircraft, tanks, and strong artillery, but were also in relatively high 
fighting spirits. Incapable of operating in the daytime, the Chinese forces had not found 
any effective way to negate the enemy's effective strength.32 Peng did not express any 
grievance at this report, but it is unlikely that Stalin did not sense China's pressure for 
more Soviet assistance. 
As Stalin read the secret reports of the Chinese complaints, he became increasingly 
dissatisfied with the progress of the Chinese Air Force, which was apparently more 
critical to the Communist war effort in Korea than he at first had anticipated. When 
responding to Beijing's complaints about the low quality of MiG-9s in late May, he 
declared that the Soviet Union would send 375 MiG-15s to the Chinese to replace the 
antiquated jets within two months. According to Stalin, it was a mistake for the Russians 
to equip the Chinese Air Force with MiG-9s, but they previously had thought the MiG-9 
fighters were superior to the best British-American jets. However, the air war over North 
Korea proved they were wrong, and in order to enhance China's national defense, he had 
to take measures to improve it. Stalin particularly excused the Soviet Union for failure to 
satisfy China's demand in the past, and now decided to make a gratuitous offer to 
compensate the Chinese.33 For the Chinese, Stalin was generous, but this generosity also 
revealed what he actually was thinking. 
On 13 June, Stalin wrote to Mao stating in no uncertain terms that he considered it 
"absolutely necessary now to start moving at least eight fighter aviation divisions from 
the sixteen Chinese divisions." In addition to two or three MiG-15 divisions, the Soviet 
leader asserted, the Chinese leadership "could take to the front from central and southern 
China five or six MiG-9 divisions, which would operate effectively against bombers." He 
also appeared highly critical and impatient about the hesitation of the Chinese leadership, 
noting that Chinese pilots should have been able to participate in combat after receiving 
seven to eight months of training; otherwise, they would be only "paper pilots."34 
Simultaneously, Stalin sent another telegram to his own military representative, Colonel 
General Stepan Krasovsky, in Beijing, criticizing him and his associates for training "the 
Koreans very slowly and in a slipshod manner," while intending to "make professors 
rather than battle pilots out of the Chinese pilots." He could not understand why Russian 
pilots could be trained during the war in five to six months, but it had been impossible to 
complete the training of Chinese pilots in seven to eight months. He urged his generals to 
throw away their "harmful overcautiousness," and devote themselves to creating "more 
quickly a group of eight Chinese fighter divisions and send them to the front." 
Concluding his directive, Stalin emphasized that the Chinese must rely only on their own 
aviation at the front, so the Soviet Air Force personnel should make available two 
airfields for the deployment of Chinese fighter divisions.35
Stalin's pressure made the Chinese leader feel rather ill at ease. Mao did not believe that 
air power should play a determining role in the war, but he also did not want to see the 
young Chinese pilots become "paper pilots," as Stalin insinuated. After receiving Stalin's 
cable message, Mao ordered the PLA General Staff to formulate a plan with regard to the 
participation of eight Chinese fighter divisions in battles.36 On 23 June, Liu Yalou 
reported to Mao that the air force would enter the war in September, but disagreed about 
sending their MiG-9 divisions to the front, because the air force leaders did not believe 
that obsolete MiG-9s would be a match for US F-84s.37 He thus requested another one 
and a half to two months to retrain the pilots of three MiG-9 divisions on MiG-15s, and 
then send them to the front. Apparently, Stalin disagreed as he read Mao's request. It 
would take him only 10 days to retrain Russian MiG-9 pilots on MiG-15s in Russia, but 
the Chinese needed a course of two months to do so!38 This appeared, however, to be the 
best Moscow could do. On 26 June, Stalin instructed Soviet air units in China to start 
retraining Chinese pilots of three air divisions immediately on MiG-15s, so that they 
could participate in the forthcoming operations in Korea.39
Interestingly, Stalin's personal attention to the air force issue probably reflected his 
anxiety about avoidance of a direct confrontation with the United States. From the 
beginning, Stalin did everything he could to deceive the world on Soviet involvement. 
Soviet pilots wore Chinese uniforms and their planes were disguised in North Korean 
colors. Several rules were prescribed to prevent Soviet pilots from flying over the sea or 
close to the front lines, as well as speaking in Russian over the radio.40 Nevertheless, the 
Soviet leader knew he could not fool the Americans. He had to keep Soviet involvement 
limited, while encouraging the Chinese to continue fighting with Soviet assistance. 
Although hundreds of MiGs piloted by Russians battled UN planes each day in the skies 
over North Korea beginning in the summer of 1951, they made little effort to coordinate 
their sorties with ground operations. Lack of air power remained a significant factor 
adversely affecting China's war efforts in Korea. 
In summer 1951, the ground war developed into a stalemate at the front lines just north of 
the 38th parallel, while the ceasefire talks began at Kaesong. For the sake of 
strengthening the Communist bargaining position at the negotiating table, in early 
August, the CPV command contrived another major offensive to drive the UN forces 
southward. This time, Peng planned to congregate 13 Chinese armies and four North 
Korean corps for the ground attack and 22 air force regiments for air support.41 He, 
however, soon learned from Beijing that three additional airfields had to be constructed in 
the area north of Anju for the air force to use in Korea.42 Without choice, Peng Dehuai 
had to cancel the planned new offensive in Korea.43 This was understandable in view of 
the CPV leader's discontent with Moscow's lack of strong support for China's war effort 
in Korea. 
Peng's disappointment about lack of air power forced him to think of a way to involve the 
Soviets more directly in the war by recommending the creation of a Sino-Soviet-Korean 
joint command. Mao, however, misunderstood Peng's real intention. On 19 September, 
he requested Stalin to dispatch a total of 83 Soviet advisors to Peng's headquarters to 
assist Chinese generals in planning and organizing warfare in Korea.44 Stalin did not 
deem it wise to send so many Soviet advisors to the CPV headquarters and its 
subordinate headquarters. He feared the dispatch of Soviet advisors to CPV's group 
armies' and armies' headquarters would place heavy responsibility on the shoulders of 
Russian generals in military operations. He thus agreed to send only five advisors to 
Peng's headquarters.45 Again, Peng felt frustrated for not being able to get the Soviets 
deeply involved in the Korean War. Several former staff officers at the CPV's 
headquarters recalled later that Peng was disgusted with the presence of this small Soviet 
advisory group, which served largely as a liaison between the CPV and the Soviet 
leadership and played an insignificant role in managing the war.46
While Peng's ground forces had been frustrated by a standstill in ground operations by 
fall 1951, circumstances were otherwise for the Communist air forces at the Yalu, which 
loomed larger than ever. Beginning in September, Soviet pilots from two fighter divisions 
intensified their operations routinely in large-scale dogfights with UN aircraft over "MiG 
Alley." The aggressiveness of the Soviet pilots forced UN Bomber Command to curtail 
B-29 raids in North Korea unless they were accompanied by fighter escorts, and 
eventually only at night. The Soviet MiGs also began systematic attacks against UN 
fighter-bombers, thereby impeding the UN railroad interdiction campaign then under 
way. At this same time, Chinese pilots also joined their Russian comrades in air 
operations, and so did North Koreans.47 At any time, from November 1951 to the 
armistice, the Communist air forces maintained three to four Chinese air divisions, along 
with two Soviet air divisions and one North Korean air division, totaling 350 to 400 MiG-
15s, at the airfields on China's side of the Yalu.48 This preponderant force frequently 
launched as many as 100 MiGs at a time, flying them over the skies of North Korea to 
provide protection for the supply lines and bridges. Although there was a need to form a 
joint command from the military point of view, the Soviets refused, continuing to operate 
independently throughout the war. The lack of a single command system and 
coordination between Soviet air units and Sino-Korean forces caused confusion. On 
occasion, Chinese or North Korean anti-aircraft artillery units blasted away at Soviet 
MiGs, while Russian pilots mistakenly shot down Chinese MiGs falsely identified as 
enemy Sabres.49  
The major setback for the Communist air forces, however, was abandonment of their plan 
for ground support. Because the US Air Force made sustained bombardments against 
Chinese efforts to activate any airfield in North Korea, the Communist air forces were 
prevented from deploying planes inside Korea. Despite Stalin's continuing pressure on 
the Chinese to move their MiG units to the bases inside Korea, insisting that it would 
drastically alter the balance of power, in December 1951 Beijing had to put aside plans 
for ground support and opted to use only airfields inside China to engage UN planes over 
Korea.50 As a result of being unable to use airfields in North Korea, the Communist 
airmen, flying the short-ranged MiG-15s, were restricted to an area no more than 150 
miles distant from home base. From a Communist perspective, the air war was purely a 
defensive one, as only fighter planes were employed and operated only over friendly 
territory. 
However, the greatest restriction on Communist war efforts in the Korean War came 
from both Moscow's and Beijing's political considerations. One important element in 
China's air war strategy in 1951 was the use of bomber aircraft to attack American targets 
in Korea directly. At the time the CPV's air force was established in spring 1951, Beijing 
authorities committed two bomber divisions to Korea. Their major targets were US 
warships off the North Korean coast and airfields at Seoul. Chinese leaders seemed aware 
that Washington had restricted bombing targets north of the Yalu River in order to limit 
the war. In a reciprocal fashion, Beijing confined Chinese air operations to defense and 
refused to allow attacks on the US safe haven south of the 38th parallel. Then, all bomber 
units were released gradually from combat duties in Korea after March 1952.51 In the 
meantime, the political limitations on the war were also Moscow's major concern. 
Learning that Peng was planning to launch a specific attack against one US division in 
early March, the Soviet leadership raised strong suspicions about the timing of such an 
operation when negotiations at Panmunjom had made significant progress during the 
prior four months toward a peace agreement.52
In late June, the US air campaign against the key dam and hydroelectric power stations 
presented a powerful dilemma for Chinese and North Korean leaders. From China's 
perspective, US bombardments would put the Communists "in a disadvantageous 
position in political and military relations" and force the Chinese and North Koreans to 
accept US terms for a truce.53 Faced with the ravages of the bombardments, Kim Il Sung 
wanted both the Chinese and Soviets to increase their assistance in Korea and the CPV to 
take on aggressive military operations instead of a passive defense. His most critical 
demand was to ask the Chinese to reconsider the use of bombers to attack enemy 
airfields, warehouses, barracks, and other military facilities in the south at night.54 Stalin 
acceded to strengthening North Korea's air defense ability by supplying more anti-aircraft 
artilleries, but fearing escalation of the war in Korea, he warned Mao that because the air 
force belonged to the state, it therefore could not be used by the Chinese "volunteers."55
Calculating that a strong Chinese air force would enable China to fight an independent air 
war in Korea, and any future war against the Western imperialists in East Asia, Stalin, 
furthermore, encouraged China to build an air force of 200 air regiments, instead of the 
150 projected by the Chinese. To match the Western technological advantage, he 
promised the Soviet Union soon would supply new fighters with speeds of 1,000-1,100 
kilometers-per-hour to China. In view of the fact that the air war in Korea served Soviet 
interests, the Soviet leader continued to support Beijing's war efforts in Korea with 
military supplies and limited air involvement, while managing to avoid direct 
confrontation with the United States.56
Because of Moscow's opposition, China had to continue to concentrate on air defense 
against US bombardments. However, as the UN air campaign was sustained against 
North Korean industrial facilities throughout the summer and early fall of 1952, the North 
Koreans began to waver, and became increasingly unsteady. Among certain members of 
North Korean leadership, there was even a state of panic. With a feeling of hopelessness, 
in early October, Kim Il Sung sent General Nam Il, chief of staff of the KPA, to the 
CPV's air force joint command at Andong to inquire whether the Chinese air force could 
bomb Seoul. Without Beijing's authorization, Nie Fengzhi, the CPV's joint air 
commander, only could agree to allow North Korean pilots to continue to fly biplanes at 
night to "heckle" UN forces. For the remaining months of the war, use of the little Po-2 
biplanes was the only Communist air tactic annoying UN forces.57
Western studies generally state that it was the building of a worldwide military structure 
by the United States that permitted more diplomatic leverage in the truce talks at 
Panmunjon. In particular, allegedly it was US nuclear capabilities that successfully 
denied the Communists victory in Korea.58 The new Soviet documents suggest that the 
severity of the burden on Russian production capacity, which still was rebuilding from 
the devastation of World War II, played a vital role in Moscow's decision-making. 
Escalation of the conflict in Korea would create for both Beijing and Pyongyang further 
excuses to press Stalin for more assistance that already had exceeded Soviet economic 
limitations. The Soviet leadership had agreed to outfit 16 Chinese army divisions with 
Soviet arms and equipment in 1951, but by April 1952, China had received equipment for 
only four divisions, of which three would be transferred to the KPA.59 In August 1952, 
Peng Dehuai requested that the Soviet Union supply the Chinese Air Force with new Tu-
16 medium jet bombers. The Soviets found it difficult to fulfill the order, and first asked 
the Chinese to buy 120 outdated Tu-4s.60 A strained economy forced Moscow to keep the 
war in Korea, as well as its assistance to China, within strictly limited parameters, and let 
the burden of the war weigh ever more heavily on its East Asian allies. When the guns 
fell silent on the Korean peninsula, the Chinese had not only sustained great physical 
losses in the conflict, but also found themselves with a huge war debt to the Soviet Union 
totaling about $650 million. This would magnify China's economic difficulties for years 
to come.61
In retrospect, the wartime relationship between China and the Soviet Union was 
complicated and delicate. After Moscow adopted an antagonistic strategy toward the 
West in the late 1940s, the Soviet leadership desperately needed China to serve as a 
bulwark for its security in East Asia. While realizing the limit on its own ability to wage a 
direct confrontation with the United States, Stalin promoted China's intervention in 
Korea, which not only prevented an expanded war beyond the Korean peninsula, but also 
kept the United States pinned down on an Asian battlefield. Although the Soviet leader 
failed to satisfy China's demands for assistance, the limited involvement of Soviet air 
units in the war and the augmentation of China's military and economic capabilities 
appeared enough to persuade the Chinese to continue fighting for nearly three years in 
Korea. As a result, the war not only deepened Chinese dependence on Moscow, but also 
allowed the Soviets to achieve transformation of their country into a superpower in a 
limited period of time. 
Although the war helped the Chinese atone for China's past humiliations at the hands of 
Western powers, and enhanced the firm Communist grip on Chinese society during the 
early years of the PRC, China's partnership with Moscow proved a galling one. Chinese 
leaders expected the alliance with Moscow based on a shared set of values and goals to 
produce unconditional Soviet support. Stalin's withholding of promised air support at the 
crucial time of 1950 and 1951, however, left China to mount military operations in Korea 
without full air cover. The storied Russian air campaigns in Korea could not compare 
with China's contribution to the war. The CPV bore heavy human and material losses, 
while Soviet involvement and assistance was too little and too late. The fight in Korea 
against the Americans, though a common enemy to both Mao and Stalin, became solely 
China's war. Nevertheless, Beijing had to consult with Moscow about its war plans and 
strategy. It was Stalin and his successors in the Kremlin who decided how the Chinese 
and North Koreans should conduct the war. As a junior partner, Mao never felt 
comfortable in this Communist alliance. Perhaps equally important was the Soviet 
request that Beijing pay for the Soviet military aid China received to fight the war, which 
"made the Soviets seem more like arms merchants than genuine Communist 
internationalists."62 Therefore, the Korean War experience suggested to the Chinese that 
the Soviet Union was an unreliable ally. In due course, China would break off this 
relationship, placing more emphasis on self-reliance as a fundamental principle for 
Chinese national security.  
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